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Introduction
A significant number of cases coming before panels and the Appellate
Body in World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement proceedings
raise issues concerning the burden of proof. I have argued that the burden
of proof answers two questions intrinsic to adversarial litigation: first,
which party must satisfy the decisionmaker on an issue once all the evi-
dence has been adduced, and second, what standard of proof must the
party fulfill?' The first question concerns the incidence of the burden of
proof, the second question goes to the quantum of proof. WTO case law
has mainly focused on the incidence of the burden of proof.2 Commentary
following the cases has sought to discern a coherent principle underlying
the various answers the Appellate Body has given as to how the burden of
proof is to be allocated when different provisions of the covered agree-
ments3 are at issue.4 The commentary has not been complimentary, sug-
gesting that the analysis the Appellate Body has adopted is neither
consistent 5 nor sufficiently coherent.6
T Member, World Trade Organization Appellate Body; Visiting Professor of Law,
Columbia Law School; Professor of Law, University of the Witwatersrand. The author
would like to thank Professors Merit Janow and Petros Mavroides for their comments on
an earlier version of this article.
1. David Unterhalter, The Burden of Proof in WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE WTO:
GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 543, 543-44 (Merit E.
Janow et al. eds., 2008).
2. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Community-Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998)
]hereinafter EC- Hormones].
3. The term "covered agreements" collectively refers to the Anti-Dumping Agree-
ment, the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the SPS Agreement, and the Subsidy
Agreement. See Yasuhei Taniguchi, The WTO Dispute Settlement as Seen by a Procedural-
ist, 42 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (2009).
4. See, e.g., Michelle T. Grando, Allocating the Burden of Proof in WTO Disputes: A
Critical Analysis, 9 J. INT'L EcON. L. 615 (2006).
5. See id. at 629 (asserting "allocation of the burden of proof has not followed a
clear pattern").
42 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 209 (2009)
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In this article, I will attempt a more modest task than to distill a prin-
ciple from these cases that both explains and justifies all that the Appellate
Body has said on this subject. First, I set out the scheme articulated by the
Appellate Body in terms of which it has allocated the burden of proof ("the
typology"). Second, I consider the typology in light of the considerations
that should be helpful in making decisions of this kind. Finally, I offer
some suggestions as to how the incidence of the burden of proof might be
determined.
1. The Typology
In US- Wool Shirts and Blouses,7 the Appellate Body articulated a sim-
ple criterion to determine how to allocate the burden of proof: the burden
rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the
affirmative of a particular claim or defence.8 This proposition appears to
be uncontroversial. It rests upon the common sense position that a party
contracts the burden of proving those facts essential to its claim or
defence. 9 But, as John Henry Wigmore observed, is there a general princi-
ple that determines "to what party's case a fact is essential?"'1 The answer
given in common law jurisdictions is usually that this is a matter of sub-
stantive law, and the allocation of the burden of proof is ultimately deter-
mined by recourse to considerations of policy and fairness reflected in the
decided cases."
The Appellate Body has not done any better or worse than domestic
courts in failing to find an overarching principle that determines the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. Rather, the Appellate Body has developed a
typology of claims and defences and has used this typology as a rule of
allocation.
One may frame the Appellate Body's typology in the following way. A
provision in the covered agreements that establishes an obligation upon a
member is styled a "positive rule."'12 A complaining party that alleges a
challenged measure to be inconsistent with such an obligation makes an
affirmative claim and, consequently, must discharge the burden of proving
this claim. 13 Certain provisions, however, do not establish obligations in
themselves; rather they are exceptions to the obligations that constitute the
positive rules. A party may invoke exceptions of this kind as an "affirma-
tive defence," justifying the inconsistency of the measure with the primary
6. See id. at 629-30.
7. Appellate Body Report, United States-Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) [hereinafter US- Wool
Shirts and Blouses].
8. Id. at 14.
9. Id.
10. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN T~iAus AT COMMON LAW § 2486
(Chadbourn rev. 1981).
11. See id.
12. US-Wool Shirts and Blouses, supra note 7, at 14-16.
13. Id. at 14-16.
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rule. 1 4 Here, the burden of proof is cast upon the party relying upon the
affirmative defence.15
The Appellate Body has added to this framework a category of provi-
sions that confer "autonomous rights." In a much cited passage in EC-
Hormones, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that a rule-
exception relationship existed between Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS
Agreement, 1 6 and characterized Article 3.3 as an autonomous right. 1 7 The
Appellate Body articulated the matter this way:
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement simply excludes from its scope of applica-
tion the kinds of situations covered by Article 3.3 of that Agreement, that is,
where a Member has projected for itself a higher level of sanitary protection
than would be achieved by a measure based on an international standard.
Article 3.3 recognizes the autonomous right of a Member to establish such
higher level of protection, provided that that Member complies with certain
requirements in promulgating SPS measures to achieve that level.18
Where a provision confers an autonomous right, the Appellate Body
authorizes action outside of the scope of application of the positive rule. 19
In this situation, it is for the complaining party to bear the burden of prov-
ing that the respondent's measure is inconsistent with the respondent's
autonomous right.20 Although the term "autonomous right" has not
always been used, the Appellate Body has understood provisions of this
kind to exclude the application of positive rules and to confer rights on
members to act outside of the strictures of such rules.2 '
Finally, the Appellate Body has observed that the distinction between
an exception and an autonomous right may not always be evident. In EC-
Tariff Preferences,2 2 the Appellate Body found that Paragraph 1 of the Ena-
14. See id. at 16.
15. Id. For examples of other cases where such affirmative defences were found, see
Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Recourse by
Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, TI 28, 37, 66, 79-81, WT/DS46/AB/RW (uly 21,
2000) [hereinafter Brazil-Aircraft]; Appellate Body Report, India- Quantitative Restric-
tions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, 1 121-136, WT/DS90/
AB/R (Aug. 23, 1999) [hereinafter India- Quantitative Restrictions]; Appellate Body
Report, Turkey- Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, 45, WT/DS34/
AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey- Textile]; Appellate Body Report, United
States- Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
277-284, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter US- Gambling].
16. EC- Hormones, supra note 2, c 104 (discussing the Agreement on the Applica-
tion of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter
SPS Agreement]).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Trade Description of Sardines,
274, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter EC-Sardines].
20. See id. 1 275.
21. See, e.g., id.
22. Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004).
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bling Clause was an exception to Article 1:1 of the GATT 1994.23 The
Appellate Body then held that a complaining party challenging a measure
taken pursuant to the Enabling Clause must identify the specific provisions
with which the challenged measure fails to comply. 24 Only then does the
respondent have the burden of proving that the measure was justified
under the exception. 2
5
II. The Typology and Concept of Rules
The Appellate Body has developed the typology discussed in the previ-
ous section as a way of classifying different provisions in the covered agree-
ments and then using the classification to allocate the burden of proof.
The issue that requires consideration is whether the classification is con-
ceptually helpful in differentiating provisions in the covered agreements.
The law is replete with rules and exceptions. However, their ubiquity
does not always render the relationship between a rule and an exception
obvious. In the simple case where a rule imposes an obligation, the scope
of the obligation may be clear and the party made subject to the rule will be
required to observe the rule by acting or refraining from acting in a particu-
lar way. The rule determines what conduct is non-optional. Outside its
scope of application, the rule has nothing to say and a party's conduct is
permissible. In that sense, a rule demarcates conduct that is optional and
non-optional. It would, however, be odd to say that what is permissible is
always an exception to the rule. If the content of the obligation is clear,
following a rule does not require a reminder that we are free to act without
constraint outside the domain that the rule regulates.
Not all rules are of this simple kind. Sometimes a rule specifies the
conditions for its application: under condition x, you are required to do y.
If x does not hold, then one is free to act without being constrained by the
rule. Again, the rule demarcates conduct that is non-optional and, here
too, we would not generally describe the optional conduct as an exception
to the rule.
Some rules specify conditions under which they do not apply: you are
required to do y, unless condition z applies. A further rule might follow to
account for the condition(s) under which the primary rule does not apply:
you are required to do y, unless condition z applies, in which case, you are
required to do p. The condition(s) under which the rule does not apply is
often referred to as an exception. We speak in this way because, but for the
specification of the condition of non-application, the conduct in question
would have fallen under the rule and been rendered non-optional or (as in
the case of the second example offered in this paragraph) the conduct
would have been regulated under a different regime of obligations.
23. Id. 11 90 (discussing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1994]).
24. Id. 101-102.
25. See id. 104.
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Finally, a rule may not specify the conditions for its application, and if
the content of the rule is not clear (or even if it is clear), the rule must be
read in light of its purpose. Here, those who follow the rule must interpret
the rule so as to decide whether a particular situation is indeed covered by
it. We may conclude that the rule was not intended to apply to the situa-
tion, even though the rule does not explicitly say so. Alternatively, we may
say that this situation is an exception to the rule, as when an act of God
prevents me from discharging my duty to honour my bargain.
This account by no means exhausts the many ways in which rules may
be cast. However, the different rules described above permit a number of
more general observations. First, whether or not a rule defines the scope
of its application, the rule functions to demarcate optional and non-
optional conduct or to differentiate types of non-optional conduct. Second,
if a rule defines the scope of its application or non-application, then the
rule is articulating a feature of all rulemaking, which is that a rule has a
particular domain. That domain is limited by the content of the rule and
its proper interpretation, as well as by any express conditions under which
the rule applies. Third, although a rule can only be understood by compre-
hending what it regulates and what it does not, we generally tend to think
of exceptions not as describing what conduct the general rule does not
reach, but rather as a follow-up, adding specific rules which set out-
expressly or tacitly-the conditions under which the general rule does not
apply. Thus, it would be odd to say that walking my dog in the park is an
exception to the general rule which requires everyone to file an income tax
return. It is not an exception. The rule requiring everyone to file income
tax returns simply has nothing to do with my walking the dog in the park.
By contrast, if a rule says all persons must file an income tax return, save
those who earn less than $10,000 per year, it makes sense to say that low
income individuals are an exception to the general rule that everyone must
file a tax return.
If we consider further the class of rules that may be said to carve out
an exception, such rules specify those instances in which the rule will gen-
erally apply and those instances in which it will not. The rule, in effect, is
made up of two rules: a primary rule that formulates an obligation and
requires its general observance, and a secondary rule that specifies the
conditions under which the primary rule does not apply.
The secondary rule may be formulated in different ways. As we have
observed, the secondary rule may simply state that a limited class of per-
sons is not burdened by the obligation of the primary rule. But the secon-
dary rule may also specify a more complex condition under which the
primary rule does not apply and may attach different obligations to a
party, even if the condition for the non-application of the primary rule is
met. A secondary rule may also be framed so as to permit an election by a
party to be bound by a separate regime of obligations. Stated more for-
mally, the primary rule stipulates that all persons must do x (or refrain
from doing x). One variant of the secondary rule (Variant 1) could state
that under condition y, x no longer applies, and you are then required to do
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z. A second variant of the secondary rule (Variant 2) could state that
under conditions specified by y, persons may elect not to do x and rather
do z.
Variant 2 has a distinctive feature. While Variant 1 specifies objective
conditions under which the obligation in the primary rule does not apply,
Variant 2 permits persons to elect to avoid the obligation specified in the
primary rule, provided that they satisfy certain conditions, which may
include carrying out other obligations.
Both Variant 1 and Variant 2 set out conditions under which the obli-
gation of general application will not apply. What sets the primary rule in
Variant 2 apart is the stipulation that an election to act in a certain way
together with the satisfaction of various conditions allows for the non-
application of the obligation of the general primary rule. A person who
qualifies to make such an election creates an exception to the application of
the general rule. But, the point of such an election is not to justify or
excuse compliance with the obligation of general application. Rather, it is
to permit different conduct subject to a distinct regime of regulation and
obligation.
The Appellate Body has adopted the language of "autonomous rights"
to characterize those provisions of the covered agreements where a member
may elect to opt out of one regime of obligations and engage in conduct,
otherwise impermissible, that is then subjected to a different regime of
obligations. 2 6 The member's election renders the primary rule inapplica-
ble, provided the member meets the requirements of the secondary rule. 27
The notion of autonomous rights may not be altogether clear in that it
suggests an unqualified freedom to avoid a general obligation. That is not
so. At best, it is an election to assume one set of obligations in place of
another.
III. The Typology and Provisions in the Covered Agreements
The Appellate Body has classified provisions of the covered agree-
ments according to a typology of positive rules, affirmative defences, and
autonomous rights. The application of the typology has, in part, reflected
an interpretative concern for the text of the provisions. The use of the word
"exception," however, has not always been dispositive, and rightly so; a rule
may be formulated to demarcate the scope of its application with or with-
out reliance upon a formal reference to an exception.
In US- Wool Shirts and Blouses, the Appellate Body classified Article
XX and Article XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT 1994 as limited exceptions. 28 Other
provisions that have been found to be affirmative defences include the pro-
viso to Article XVIII: 11 of the GATT 1994 regarding balance of payments, 29
26. See, e.g., EC- Hormones, supra note 2, T1 104, 172.
27. See id.
28. US-Wool Shirts and Blouses, supra note 7, at 14-16.
29. See India- Quantitative Restrictions, supra note 15, TI 132-136.
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item (k) in the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies of the SCM Agreement 30
regarding certain export credits,3 1 Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 regard-
ing customs unions and free trade areas, 3 2 and Article XIV of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services 33 (GATS). 34
In EC- Hormones, the Appellate Body interpreted Article 3.3 of the SPS
Agreement to be an autonomous right and not an exception to Article
3.1.35 In EC- Sardines, the Appellate Body considered Article 2.4 of the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade3 6 (TBT Agreement) to be concep-
tually similar and found that there was no rule-exception relationship
between the first and second parts of Article 2.4.37 Additionally in Brazil-
Aircraft, the Appellate Body held that Article 27.2(b) of the SCM Agree-
ment rendered the prohibition in Article 3. 1(a) inapplicable to a developing
country, provided that such members comply with the provisions of Article
27.4.38
Therefore, the typology is well entrenched in Appellate Body decision-
making. But what does the typology differentiate? Contrast Article XX of
the GATT 1994 with Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement. Article XX states
that subject to a prohibition against arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion, nothing in the GATT shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement of enumerated measures, such as measures necessary to pro-
tect human, animal, or plant life or health.3 9 Under Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of
the SPS Agreement, members shall base their sanitary and phytosanitary
measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations
(international norms) where they exist, except that a member may intro-
duce measures resulting in a higher level of protection than those based on
the international norms under certain conditions. 40
At a formal level, Article XX of the GATT 1994 and Article 3.3 of the
SPS Agreement both allow a member to take measures that would other-
wise infringe upon a regime of obligations of general application. Both
provisions permit, but do not require, a member to deviate from the gen-
eral obligations; in this sense, the measure the member takes is elective.
But that election to deviate comes with obligatory consequences. In Article
XX, the elective measures may not be "applied in a manner which would
30. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1867 U.N.T.S.
14.
31. See Brazil-Aircraft, supra note 15, 11 79-81.
32. See Turkey- Textile, supra note 15, 1 45.
33. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter
GATS].
34. See US- Gambling, supra note 15, 'I 277-284.
35. EC-FHormones, supra note 2, 104.
36. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
37. EC-Sardines, supra note 19, 275.
38. Brazil-Aircraft, supra note 15, 1I 139-140.
39. GATT 1994 art. XX.
40. SPS Agreement arts. 3.1, 3.3.
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constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade."4 1 Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement allows a member
to adopt a higher level of protection, but only if there is a scientific justifica-
tion for it or if a member determines the higher level of protection is appro-
priate under the disciplines of assessment set out in Article 5.42 The
structure of the two provisions is much the same, yet their characterization
under the typology of the Appellate Body is different.
Therefore, either the typology rests upon a distinction without a differ-
ence or the typology seeks to capture a difference that is not reflected in
the formal or structural features of an exception. As previously discussed,
an exception is a specific kind of rule that provides for conditions under
which an obligation of general application does not apply. While there is
considerable flexibility in the framing of those conditions, the conceptual
linkage is hard to escape because the conditions always reference the pri-
mary obligation. The fact that a member can elect to take a measure that is
subject to different obligations does not make that elected measure some-
thing other than an exception to the member's existence. Hence, the typol-
ogy cannot rest on the formal or structural characteristics of rules and
exceptions.
IV. The Typology Reconsidered
The typology may be understood in a different way. Rather than using
the typology as a formal means by which to characterize provisions in the
covered agreements, it may be more helpful to consider the typology as a
way to reason about the allocation of the burden of proof.
The consideration of costs is one principle by reference to which the
burden of proof may be allocated. First, there are costs associated with
erroneous rulings. There are two types of error of this kind: to rule that a
measure is inconsistent with the covered agreements when it is, in fact,
consistent (a Type I error), and to rule that a measure is consistent with the
covered agreements when it is in fact inconsistent (a Type II error). The
relative costs of these two types of error in relation to a specific provision
of the covered agreements are not always easy to assess. Nor is it clear
which type of error is more likely to be made. Second, there are direct
costs that accrue to members who engage the dispute settlement system.
Although we might justifiably wish to minimize these costs and use the
burden of proof to do so, we are confronted by quite considerable deficits
of information in determining the costs, the risk of their occurrence, and
the utility of an allocation of the burden of proof to minimize social loss.
Professor Bruce Hay has acknowledged that a basis for allocating the bur-
den is that the plaintiffs claim is less likely to be meritorious (where other
41. GATT 1994 art. XX.
42. SPS Agreement arts. 3.1, 3.3.
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costs might not burden one party more than another). 43 It is hard, how-
ever, to make that judgment of probabilities for the kinds of claims made in
dispute settlement proceedings. For example, it is difficult to determine if
a member based its measure on an assessment of risk under Article 5 of
the SPS Agreement. 4 4
Because it is difficult to assess relative costs, we may proceed cau-
tiously and assert that even if the social costs cannot be shown to burden
one party more than another, the member who disturbs the status quo and
potentially triggers a risk of error should bear the burden of establishing a
breach of the covered agreements. The typology utilizes this reasoning to
allocate the burden of proof to the complainant who alleges that a measure
taken by a member is inconsistent with its obligations under the covered
agreements. Some information as to relevant costs, particularly the costs
of error, often will support a prudential allocation of this kind. Because
the SPS Agreement touches upon issues of human health, we would likely
be more inclined to take the risk of a Type II error rather than a Type I
error. Thus, the allocation of the burden of proof to the complainant may
be warranted.
The principles relevant to the allocation of the burden of proof should
not, however, be reduced to a cost calculus. Just as the use of presump-
tions in law is not based on a single justification, the allocation of the bur-
den of proof will yield to different considerations. I have argued elsewhere
that "legal regimes use presumptions for different reasons: to abbreviate
chains of reasoning, to give expression to important values, and sometimes
simply as a pragmatic way of providing an answer under conditions of
uncertainty. '45 The same is true of the factors that determine the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. Various provisions of the covered agreements,
invoked in different procedural settings and at different stages of the dis-
pute settlement process, may allow for a range of reasoning that is not cap-
tured by the prudential justification ventured above-not even by a cost
calculus, if it can be done. Thus, we do not have recourse to a mechanistic
rule of allocation, lest we oust from the reckoning relevant reasons.
One class of reasons that may be available to allocate the burden of
proof is the relationship in law between unlawful conduct and grounds of
justification or excuse that either renders the conduct lawful or otherwise
excludes liability. In criminal law, self-defence justifies an assault; in con-
tract law, supervening impossibility of performance allows a party to break
a promise. There is, however, an ongoing controversy in different fields of
law as to how to properly understand these matters. Does a defendant's
invocation of self-defence negate an element of the offence of assault, or
43. See Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof, 72 IND. LJ. 651, 677 (1997)
(noting that a departure from the general rule allocating the burden to the plaintiff may
be justified where the plaintiff likely has a meritorious claim).
44. See Ryan David Thomas, Note, Where's the Beef? Mad Cows and the Blight of the
SPS Agreement, 32 VAD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487, 505 (1999) (describing factors involved in
a risk assessment under the SPS Agreement); see also SPS Agreement art. 5.1.
45. Unterhalter, supra note 1, at 545.
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does it operate as a justification that stands apart from the offence's defini-
tional requirements? The latter construction is often referred to as an
affirmative defence, a term which has important consequences in criminal
law because the prosecution is not required to disprove an affirmative
defence beyond a reasonable doubt.46
The concept of an affirmative defence warrants closer consideration
because it is utilized in the typology of the Appellate Body to differentiate
provisions that are not positive rules.4 7 Just as criminal law has found it
difficult to determine a principled basis upon which to distinguish whether
an issue forms part of the definition of an offence or constitutes a separate
justification, so too the typology constructs the categories "positive rule"
and "affirmative defence," but the application of these categories is some-
times opaque.
It is not possible to determine whether a provision is a positive rule or
an affirmative defence simply by analyzing the text of the provision in
question. The language of the provision is seldom self-declaring. Nor
should great reliance be placed upon an argument that characterizes a pro-
vision on the basis that relevant evidence is peculiarly within the knowl-
edge of one member rather than another. Quite often, in entirely
uncontroversial matters, one party must prove a thing supposedly better
known by that party's adversary, yet the burden of proof does not shift.48
As Glanville Williams pointed out in the criminal law context, peculiar
knowledge would require a defendant, instead of the prosecution, to prove
a lack of mens rea4 9 -a conclusion that seems aberrant. Determining how
provisions in the covered agreements stand in relation to one another bet-
ter captures the difference between a positive rule and an affirmative
defence. This distinction should be looked at not as a formal matter of
rulemaking, but rather by reference to the regulatory purpose underlying
the rules.
No principle is more fundamental under the covered agreements than
the principle of non-discrimination captured by the obligations of Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment in Article 1:1 of the GATT 1994.50 Yet, other
conflicting principles may be so compelling as to justify a departure from
adherence to the principle of non-discrimination. The Appellate Body
found this to be so with respect to Article XX of the GATT 1994 in US-
Wool Shirts and Blouses.5 1 Public morals and human health are values that
may compete and conflict with the principle of non-discrimination embod-
46. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
47. See Grando, supra note 4, at 625.
48. See Petko D. Kantchevski, Note, The Differences Between the Panel Procedures of
the GATT and the WTO: The Role of GATT and WTO Panels in Trade Dispute Settlement, 3
BYU INT' L. & MGMT. REv. 79, 129-30 (2006).
49. Glanville Williams, The Logic of "Exceptions", 47 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 261, 267-68
(1988).
50. See GATT 1994 art. 1:1; see also WoRLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO
10 (4th ed. 2008).
51. See US-Wool Shirts and Blouses, supra note 7, at 14-16.
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ied in the GATT trading system. 52 A measure may thus be discriminatory
and breach the obligations of Article 1:1, but there may be a separate basis
for condoning such non-compliance in special circumstances where a dif-
ferent and conflicting principle holds sway. A member who would justify
an otherwise unlawful measure by recourse to a principle of human health,
for example, may do so within the scheme of Article XX.5 3 To escape the
ordinary consequences of violating its obligation of non-discrimination,
however, a member must bear the onus of proof.5 4 Through this reason-
ing, we recognize that the measure breaches the obligation of non-discrimi-
nation and note that the invocation of the exception does not diminish that
breach; rather the exception condones the breach in the face of proof that
the measure is required for another purpose, which the agreement allows.
We may contrast this kind of reasoning with the analysis applicable to
Article 3.1 and Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement. 55 Article 3.3 permits a
member to impose sanitary or phytosanitary measures that are objectively
more stringent and that result in higher levels of protection than those
achieved by measures based on international standards, as required by
Article 3.1.56 There is a consistent thread that runs between Article 3.1
and Article 3.3. Together, they create an international baseline standard
that all members must meet, and they provide members with the option of
putting in place measures that meet a higher standard under certain condi-
tions. A measure taken under Article 3.3 is not justified by recourse to an
independent principle that conflicts with the purposes underlying Article
3.1 or any other provision of the SPS Agreement.5 7 Therefore, a member
has a choice as to which standards to apply, but by choosing a higher stan-
dard than the international baseline, the member is not excused from com-
pliance with all of the requirements of the international standard.
Reasoning in this way supports the view that Article 3.3 is not an affirma-
tive defence to a failure to fully comply with Article 3.1. Article 3.3 simply
sets out an alternative regime of obligations. Or, to put the matter differ-
ently, Article 3.3 frames positive rules that may be followed as an alterna-
tive to the positive rules set out in Article 3.1.
The interplay between these provisions, then, does not suggest that
autonomous rights are distinct bundles of independent rights. Rather, the
language of autonomous rights emphasizes that provisions may be inter-
52. See GATT 1994 arts. XX(b), XX(d) (listing public morals and human health as
general exceptions to other articles in the GATT).
53. See id. art. 1:1; see also Elvira Cortez, Comment, Total Recall on Chinese Imports:
Pursuing an End to Unsafe Health and Safety Standards Through Article XX of GATT, 23
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 915, 926 (2008) (noting that a party can only claim an Article XX
exception after a WTO panel determines there has been a violation of the GATT).
54. See Grando, supra note 4, at 618 (stating that the burden of proof lies on the
party trying to invoke an exception to the GATT).
55. See SPS Agreement arts. 3.1, 3.3.
56. See id.
57. See id. art. 3.3 (noting that "all measures which result in a level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection different from that which would be achieved by measures
based on international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall not be inconsis-
tent with any other provision of this Agreement").
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linked so as to offer a choice between obligations (or regimes of obliga-
tions). However, the selection of one set of obligations over another is not a
justification of a measure that would otherwise be unlawful.
Where a provision, upon proper analysis, permits a member to justify
a measure that would otherwise be inconsistent with its obligations, there
is good reason to depart from the prudential rule of allocation and there-
fore place the burden of proving that an obligation has been breached upon
the complainant. Justification, by its very nature, is predicated upon
proof-actual or prospective-of such a breach having taken place; for justi-
fication is only required where there is something to justify. Once the com-
plainant has discharged its burden of proof, then it is for the member who
seeks to be excused of the ordinary consequences of breach to prove the
justification for the breach. Put differently, the member invoking the justi-
fication would now alter a new equilibrium established by the complain-
ant's proof of breach, and to do so, the member must show that it was
justified in taking the measure that it did.
Understood in this way, the typology is simply a shorthand way of
referring to different kinds of reasoning as to how provisions in the covered
agreements should be understood. The typology should be understood for
what it is-a heuristic device. Ultimately, we want to interpret the provi-
sions in a manner that provides a basis for the allocation of the burden of
proof.
One approach to allocating the burden of proof in a case in which a
member seeks to justify a measure that is otherwise unlawful would be to
first require proof that an unlawful act occurred. This approach is consis-
tent with the primary rule of allocation which requires the member who
claims that a measure is inconsistent with the requirements of the covered
agreements to prove inconsistency. Thus, when a member raises justifica-
tion as an affirmative defence, it bears the burden of proof only if its adver-
sary first satisfies the burden of proving the member's act was actually
unlawful.
Conclusion
The allocation of the burden of proof is not responsive to reductionist
reasoning. The formal features of the relationship between rules and
exceptions do not provide a clear basis to develop a general rule regarding
the allocation of the burden of proof. Narrow textual analysis does not
provide an answer either. Rather, the allocation is responsive to more wide-
ranging reasoning.
The typology of the Appellate Body is shorthand for certain kinds of
reasoning about the allocation of the burden of proof. So understood, the
typology of the Appellate Body serves not so much to determine when a
provision captures a rule-exception relationship, because this relationship
is a feature of rules that, with varying degrees of specificity, determines the
basis of their application. An exception is but a specific variant that com-
mands a particular application of the rule so as to permit conduct that
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would otherwise be prohibited under the rule's general application.
Rather, the typology is intended to capture the distinction between a rule
that allows a party to justify its failure to observe an obligation of general
application and a rule that permits a party to engage in conduct which is
regulated under an alternative scheme of regulation.

